The SEC's November 13, 2026 proposal to overhaul executive and director compensation disclosure would let most public companies report pay for just two executives instead of five or more, raise the perquisite reporting threshold from $10,000 to $150,000, and replace today's prescriptive line-item regime with a principles-based standard. But the real decision facing boards is not whether the rules change—it is whether to use the new flexibility. Compliance savings are real, yet investors who prefer fulsome reporting may read slimmer disclosure as reduced transparency. Nothing in the proposal affects the 2027 proxy season, so leadership teams have time to make that choice deliberately rather than reactively.
Understanding the SEC's Proposed Disclosure Overhaul
On November 13, 2026, the SEC issued a 542-page release proposing amendments to executive and director compensation disclosure requirements for U.S. publicly traded companies. The SEC states the proposal aims to make rules more principles-based, reduce compliance burdens, and maintain disclosure of material information to investors. If adopted, this would mark the most significant change to executive compensation disclosure since the 2006 overhaul that introduced the Compensation Discussion and Analysis and modernized the Summary Compensation Table.
The SEC frames the proposal as a refocusing of disclosures—last comprehensively reformed in 2006—on material information, part of Chairman Atkins' efforts to reduce friction for companies joining and remaining in the public markets. The amendments would also improve investors' ability to track equity awards through their lifecycle and give registrants more flexibility to present disclosures in a way that reflects how compensation programs are actually constructed and the intention of boards and compensation committees.
Commissioner Uyeda, in a statement accompanying the proposal, argued the existing regime has focused too often on adding granular line items rather than evaluating whether the overall structure is cohesive and rational—"we have missed the forest for the trees." The proposal, he wrote, would refocus disclosure on the individuals most critical to the success or failure of the enterprise while reducing unnecessary complexity and volume.
Two caveats matter for planning. First, these are proposed rules, subject to change before finalization. Second, the proposal builds on a separate May 2026 SEC release that would sort most companies into large accelerated filers (public float above $2 billion) and non-accelerated filers (below $2 billion), with scaled obligations for the latter. The compensation disclosure changes should be read alongside that broader classification effort, whose stated rationale is to lower compliance costs and encourage companies to go public and stay public.
Key Proposed Changes to Executive Compensation Disclosure
The most consequential change is the narrowing of named executive officers. The proposal would limit NEOs to the principal executive officer and principal financial officer—generally the CEO and CFO—covering individuals who served in either role during the last completed fiscal year. That reduces the typical NEO group from five or more to two in most circumstances. Three new tables would replace, among others, the Summary Compensation Table, and the proposal would significantly scale back pay-versus-performance, pay ratio, perquisite and severance disclosures. Certain requirements—the Pension Benefits Table, the Nonqualified Deferred Compensation Table, and prescriptive disclosures on compensation-related risk and grant timing relative to material nonpublic information—would be eliminated entirely.
Perquisite reporting would shrink dramatically. The minimum aggregate reporting threshold for executive perquisites would rise from $10,000 to $150,000, and security at an executive's personal residence or during personal travel would be removed from the list of perks requiring public disclosure. Chairman Atkins has argued the current treatment of executive security—treated as a personal perk since 2006 because it was not considered directly related to job performance—is due for modernization, and that a regime requiring additional disclosure to explain the original disclosure signals simplification is overdue.
Non-accelerated filers would receive further accommodations under the related May proposal, including reduced disclosure obligations such as shorter pay-history periods and fewer required NEOs. That earlier release also contemplated the elimination of Say on Pay votes for NAFs, which would remove investors' most direct mechanism for expressing views on executive pay.
One underappreciated point: even if adopted, the rule would not eliminate internal monitoring obligations. Law firm analyses from Skadden and the Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance contributors both note that Section 162(m) compliance, compensation committee oversight under committee charters, Form 8-K Item 5.02(c) appointment disclosure, and Section 16 reporting on Form 4 would still require companies to track compensation for officers beyond the CEO and CFO. The savings are largely in public disclosure, not in the underlying data infrastructure.
Decision Framework: Navigating SEC Disclosure Choices
The framework below maps each major proposed change to its compliance benefit and its investor and governance risk, so boards can evaluate adoption item by item rather than as a single yes-or-no. The central tension, as compensation consultancy Pay Governance observes, is that companies able to provide substantially slimmer disclosure must still weigh that opportunity against the expectations of investors who prefer more fulsome reporting.
| Proposed Change | Potential Compliance Benefit | Potential Investor/Governance Risk |
|---|---|---|
| NEOs narrowed to the PEO and PFO (typically two, down from five or more) | Reduced complexity and cost of identifying, tracking and reporting compensation for a broader executive group; reporting aligned with the individuals the SEC views as most critical to the enterprise | Investors lose visibility into pay for other key executives, limiting their ability to assess governance practices and executive incentives |
| Perquisite threshold raised from $10,000 to $150,000; residential and personal-travel security excluded | Less time and resources spent valuing and disclosing minor perquisites; disclosure focuses on more material compensation elements | Reduced granular transparency into the full scope of executive benefits; investors who emphasize perquisite detail may raise questions |
| Principles-based standard replacing prescriptive line items; several tables and disclosures eliminated | More flexibility to present pay as boards and compensation committees intend; lower production burden | Companies and investors may interpret "materiality" differently, affecting comparability across issuers and shareholder engagement |
| Scaled NAF disclosure and potential elimination of Say on Pay for NAFs (under the related May 2026 proposal) | Substantially slimmer disclosure obligations for smaller companies | Loss of investors' direct voice on pay; scrutiny may shift toward compensation committee member elections. Some companies may retain Say on Pay voluntarily |
How a board uses this framework depends on its investor base. A company whose largest holders prize detailed pay transparency may conclude that voluntary retention of fuller disclosure—or of Say on Pay, where its elimination is contemplated—protects relationships worth more than the compliance savings. A company with less investor pressure on pay detail may capture the savings fully. The proposal's flexibility is precisely what makes this a strategic choice rather than a compliance exercise.
Proactive Planning for Future Proxy Seasons
Boards should proactively assess the strategic implications of the SEC's proposed executive compensation disclosure changes, considering both potential compliance cost reductions and the impact on investor relations, to determine their optimal disclosure philosophy for the 2028 proxy season and beyond. The proposal does not affect the 2027 proxy season, and the rules remain subject to change through the public comment process before finalization—so the immediate task is positioning, not drafting.
Concretely, the company's investor relations team should report on shareholder feedback regarding transparency, and the legal and compliance team should monitor the finalization of the SEC rules and the end of the public comment period. Those two signals—what your shareholders actually expect, and what the final rules actually require—are the measurable inputs that should drive the board's decision on how much of the new flexibility to use.
Sources
- SEC Proposes Executive and Director Compensation Disclosure Reforms — U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
- Business
- SEC Proposes Sweeping Overhaul of Executive Compensation Disclosure Rules — Global Financial Regulatory Insights
- Statement on Proposing Release for Executive Compensation Disclosure Reform — U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
- SEC Proposes Sweeping Changes to Executive Compensation Disclosure Requirements | Insights — Skadden
- SEC Proposes Sweeping Changes to Executive Compensation Disclosure Requirements — The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance
- SEC Client Alert: Executive Compensation Disclosure Changes (Proposed Rules) – May 2026 — Pay Governance LLC
- SEC Proposes Sweeping Overhaul of Executive & Director Compensation Disclosure Rules — Gibson Dunn





